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APPEALABILITY OF DENIALS OF MOTIONS TO DISQUALIFY COUNSEL
Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,
496 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1974)
Defendants' moved to disqualify2 and enjoins plaintiff's attorneys
1. Chrysler Motors Corp. and Chrysler Realty Corp. (jointly referred to herein-
after as Chrysler).
2. "Disqualification" refers to a court order directing an attorney to withdraw from
a case. Motions to disqualify are generally made by a party to a suit who is a former
client of an attorney presently representing an adverse interest. This conflicting rela-
tionship raises the possibility that, in prosecuting or defending the present action, the
attorney has disclosed or used confidential information obtained from the former client,
especially if matters in the present suit are substantially related to the subject matter
of the former employment. Such disclosure or use would violate Canon 4 of the Ameri-
can Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility (1969): "A lawyer should
preserve the confidences and secrets of a client." Although the Code does not have the
force of a statute, "it is recognized by bench and bar as setting forth proper standards
of professional conduct." Estates Theatres, Inc. v. Columbia Pictures Indus., Inc., 345
F. Supp. 93, 95 n.1 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). Using a confidence or secret of a client without
his consent for the attorney's own advantage or the advantage of a third person will
also warrant disciplinary action, see ABA CODE or PRopuss:oNAL RESPONsmILrrY DR
4-101(B) (3), but a disqualification proceeding is not in the nature of a disciplinary pro-
ceeding. A disqualification simply means that the attorney may not participate in, or
give advice concerning, the further conduct of the suit. See generally Annot., 31
A.L.R.3d 715 (1970); Annot., 52 A.L.R.2d 1243 (1957). For a discussion of what con-
stitutes representation of conflicting interests subjecting the attorney to disciplinary ac-
tion, see Annot., 17 A.L.R.3d 835 (1968).
Although a motion to disqualify one party's counsel is normally made by an adverse
party, the court may order disqualification on its own initiative. W.E. Bassett Co. v.
H.C. Cook Co., 201 F. Supp. 821 (D. Conn.), affd per curiam, 302 F.2d 268 (2d Cir.
1962); Porter v. Huber, 68 F. Supp. 132 (W.D. Wash. 1946).
This Comment is limited in scope to the procedural aspects of federal appeals of
orders denying disqualification. For discussions of the standards used in determining
the merits of motions to disqualify, see Emre Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d
562 (2d Cir. 1973); Brasseaux v. Girouard, 214 So. 2d 401 (La. Ct. App. 1968); Kauf-
man, The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of Professional Ethics, 70
HAnv. L. Rav. 657 (1957); 68 HAnv. L. IRnv. 1084 (1955); 11 N.Y.L.F. 148 (1965);
64 YAL, LJ. 917 (1955).
3. Motions to disqualify are often phrased as injunctions against further participa-
tion and assistance in the suit. Historically, the English procedure to disqualify an at-
torney was a bill in equity to enjoin the attorney's participation. See, e.g., Little v.
Kingswood Colieries Co., 20 Ch. D. 733 (1882); Cholmondeley v. Clinton, 34 Eng.
Rep. 515 (Ch. 1815). This procedure has sometimes been used in state actions. See,
e.g., Murphy v. Riggs, 238 Mich. 151, 213 N.W. 110 (1927).
If the motion to disqualify is in the form of an injunction, some state courts consider
its denial to be a denial of an injunction and therefore immediately appealable under
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from further participation in the action.4 The federal district court
denied the motion and refused to include in its order a statement that
would have permitted an immediate discretionary appeal of the inter-
locutory order to the court of appeals.5 Defendants then filed notice
state law. See, e.g., Meehan v. Hopps, 45 Cal. 2d 213, 288 P.2d 267 (1955), discussed
In 15 HASTINoS L.J. 105 (1963). Federal courts, however, refuse to consider such mo-
dons as applications for "injunctions" in determining their appealability. See, e.g.,
Fleischer v. Phillips, 264 F.2d 515, 516 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959).
4. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., Civil No. 73-853
(E.D.N.Y., filed June 12, 1973), is the pending suit. Dale Schreiber, one of the at-
torneys, was formerly employed by a large law firm and worked on certain litigation
matters for Chrysler. Schreiber left the firm and joined with Alexander Hammond to
form a new firm, which was engaged by plaintiff, a Chrysler dealership, to prosecute
a claim against Chrysler. Chrysler's attempt to disqualify Hammond & Schreiber was
based on Sehreiber's previous employment and the relevant confidential information con-
cmrning Chrysler practices and procedures that Schreiber had allegedly obtained or had
access to while so employed.
5. For District Judge Weinstein's opinion denying the motion to disqualify, see
Slver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y.
1973).
If a party can persuade a district judge to include in his order a statement pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970), and the court of appeals agrees to accept the appeal,
the party can obtain immediate review of an interlocutory order. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b)
(1970) provides:
When a district judge, in making in a civil action an order not otherwise
appealable under this section, shall be of the opinion that such order involves
a controlling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for dif-
ference of opinion and that an immediate appeal from the order may materially
advance the ultimate termination of the litigation, he shall so state in writing
in such order. The Court of Appeals may thereupon, in its discretion, permit
an appeal to be taken from such order, if application is made to it within ten
days after the entry of the order ....
Added by the Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-919, 72 Stat. 1770,
this section provides the district and circuit courts with a limited means of permitting
appeal of otherwise unappealable interlocutory orders. An order may be amended by
the district judge to include the necessary statement upon a party's motion pursuant to
Flo. R. Apr. P. 5(a).
In the principal case, after the district judge refused to include a § 1292(b) statement,
Chrysler moved in the court of appeals for permission to appeal pursuant to § 1292(b)
and FED. R. App. P. 5. This motion was a hopeless gesture, however, because if a
district judge refuses to include the statutory statement, there can be no appeal under
I 1292(b). United States v. 687.30 Acres of Land, 451 F.2d 667 (8th Cir. 1971); 9
I. MooRF, FEDERAL PRAc'CE % 110.2213] (2d ed. 1973) [hereinafter cited as MooRE];
ate Note, Interlocutory Appeals in the Federal Courts Under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), 88
HARv. L. Rav. 607, 613-14 (1975). The courts of appeals also refuse to issue writs of
mandamus directing district judges to certify issues for appeal under § 1292(b). See,
e.g., Leasco Data Processing Equip. Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326, 1344 (2d Cir.
1972):
Congress plainly intended that an appeal under § 1292(b) should lie only when
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of direct'appeal from the order." The Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit denied plaintiff's motion to dismiss the appeal, and held: A
federal district court's denial of a motion to disqualify counsel is di-
rectly appealable.7
the district court and the court of appeals agreed on its propriety. It would
wholly frustrate this scheme if the court of appeals could coerce decision by
the district judge.
6. Defendants claimed rights of appeal under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1291, 1292(a) (1970).
In response to the notice of direct appeal, plaintiff moved to dismiss the appeal. A mo-
tion to dismiss an appeal on the ground that the order is not appealable raises the issue
of the appellate jurisdiction of the court of appeals; but even if the question of appeal-
ability is not raised by the parties, a court will consider the question in order to de-
termine if it has jurisdiction. E.g., Shanferoke Coal & Supply Corp. v. Westchester Serv.
Corp., 293 U.S. 449 (1935).
Unsure whether a right of appeal lay from denial of a motion to disqualify, defendants
also petitioned the court under 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a) (1970) for a writ of mandamus
directing the district judge to vacate his original order, disqualify plaintiff's counsel, and
dismiss the complaint without prejudice. Some courts, refusing to find a denial of a mo-
tion to disqualify counsel to be final and appealable, have accepted petitions for writs
of mandamus in order to consider the disqualification question on the merits. See, e.g.,
Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1964) discussed in note 18 infra.
Defendants did not request that the district judge dismiss the complaint with prejudice
since the purpose of a disqualification proceeding is not to punish the attorney's present
client, or even the attorney, but rather to protect the confidential disclosures made to
the attorney by the former client. Colonial Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pic-
tures, Inc., 262 F.2d 856 (2d Cir. 1959). When disqualification is ordered, the actions
a court may take to protect the interests of the former client are discretionary and vary
according to the stage of the proceedings and the conduct of the attorney. In Doe V.
A Corp., 330 F. Supp. 1352 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd per curiam sub nom. Hall v. A
Corp., 453 F.2d 1375 (2d Cir. 1972), the district court dismissed the complaint without
prejudice and also directed that the file of the case be sealed by the clerk. Often, how-
ever, the attorney is merely enjoined from further participation "except to the limited
extent reasonably necessary to the transfer of [his] duties to new counsel." E.F. Hut-
ton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 401 (S.D. Tex. 1969). The suit itself continues
except for a change of counsel. Colonial Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pic-
tures, Inc., supra. If several attorneys from different firms are representing the same
party, the disqualified attorney may simply be directed to "disappear" from the lawsuit
while the other attorneys continue the case. W.E. Bassett Co. v. H.C. Cook Co., 201
F. Supp. 821, 825 (D. Conn.), affd per curiam, 302 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1962).
7. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 496 F.2d 800 (2d Cir.
1974). The court of appeals had joined the petition for a writ of mandamus and the
motion to dismiss the appeal, see note 6 supra, and considered them en bane. After
holding the order directly appealable, the court found it unnecessary to consider the mer-
its of the petition for a writ and dismissed the petition as moot. 496 F.2d at 806.
Throughout its opinion, the court expressly refused to consider the merits of the motion
to disqualify and limited itself to the appealability question. In a subsequent decision
on the merits, a panel of the court affirmed the district court's denial of disqualification.
Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 418 F.2d 751 (2d Cir. 1975).
Washington University Open Scholarship
Vol. 1975:212] DENIALS OF MOTIONS
In the Judiciary Act of 1789, Congress provided that appeals in all
federal civil cases would lie only from "final decrees and judgments.""
While mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, was available to allow im-
mediate review of an interlocutory order,9 federal courts used that rem-
edy only sparingly and thereby maintained a general final judgment re-
quirement for appeals. Although the courts refused to interpret
"final" in a highly technical sense during the nineteenth century, they
nevertheless kept relaxation of the finality requirement within narrow
8. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 22, 1 Stat. 84. The requirement of a final judg-
ment derives from English common law, which required a final judgment in the lower
court before a party could obtain a writ of error, the procedure used by the King's Bench
to review the decisions of lower courts. See McLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661 (1891). Ap-
parently the reason for requiring a final judgment was simply that the record of a case
could not be in two courts at one time. Crick, The Final Judgment as a Basis for Ap-
peal, 41 YALE L.J. 539, 541-44 (1932). In contrast, English equity practice allowed ap-
peals even from interlocutory decrees. See Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6 How.) 201,
205 (1848); Crick, supra at 545-48.
The early American states generally followed the English common law precedent for
appeals from actions at law, and many enacted statutes incorporating the final judgment
requirement into equity as well. Enactment of these statutes was due partly to a general
merger of law and equity, and partly to the relative unimportance of most questions
brought up on interlocutory appeals. See Crick, supra at 549-50.
The justifications for the federal requirement of a final judgment or decree before ap-
peal developed as the appellate courts became more congested and courts began to fear
an onslaught of interlocutory appeals. Crick, supra at 550-51. Justice Story, in Canter
v. American Ins. Co., 28 U.S. (3 Pet.) 307 (1830), was one of the first to justify the
requirement, stating:
It is of great importance to the due administration of justice, and is in further-
ance of the manifest intention of the legislature, in giving appellate jurisdiction
to this court upon final decrees only, that causes should not come up here in
fragments, upon successive appeals. It would occasion very great delays, and
oppressive expenses.
Id. at 318 (emphasis original). Intermediate appeals raise the problem of possible har-
assment as well as expense and delay. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325
(1940). Conservation of judicial resources, possible settlement of the main action, and
the possibility that subsequent rulings by the trial court will make appeal unnecessary
are all justifications for allowing appeal only from final judgments. See Parkinson v.
April Indus., Inc., Civil Nos. 74-2058, -2214 (2d Cir., June 30, 1975); Note, Appeal-
ability in the Federal Courts, 75 HARv. L. REv. 351, 352 (1961); Note, The Finality
and Appealability of Interlocutory Orders, 7 SUFFOLK L. REv. 1037, 1040 (1973); Note,
Discretionary Appeals of District Court Interlocutory Orders, 69 YALE L.J. 333, 334
(1959).
9. Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 13, 14, 1 Stat. 80 (now 28 U.S.C. § 1651(a)
(1970)). In order not to undermine the system of appellate review, the scope of review
available in a mandamus proceeding traditionally has been limited to correcting the abdi-
cation or usurpation of authority, or clear abuse of power, by the lower court. 9 MoORE
T 110.02, at 51; see Paar v. United States, 351 U.S. 513, 520-21 (1956).
215
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss1/16
216 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1975:212
bounds."° To ameliorate the harshness of the general rule, Congress
passed several exceptions, the most important of which were the 1891
provision for immediate review of orders granting or continuing injunc-
tions1 and the 1958 provision for discretionary review of interlocutory
orders that meet certain criteria. 12
10. Exemplifying the nontechnical interpretation was Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. (6
How.) 201, 203 (1848), in which Chief Justice Taney stated:
Undoubtedly, [the decree] is not final, in the strict, technical sense of that
term. But this court has not heretofore understood the words "final decrees"
in this strict and technical sense, but has given to them a more liberal, and,
as we think, a more reasonable construction, and one more consonant to the
intention of the legislature.
This statement reflected the early Supreme Court view that a decree was not interlocu-
tory simply because ministerial duties remained to be performed. See The Palmyra, 23
U.S. (10 Wheat.) 502, 504 (1825); Ray v. Law, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 179, 180 (1805).
Generally, however, the courts required a final judgment, stressing the long-established
policy against piecemeal appeals. See, e.g., MeLish v. Roff, 141 U.S. 661, 665-66
(1891).
11. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 517, § 7, 26 Stat 828, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1292
(a) (1) (1970). The Court in Baltimore Contractors, Inc. v. Bodinger, 348 U.S. 176,
181 (1955) suggested that the "need to permit litigants to effectually challenge interlocu-
tory orders of serious, perhaps irreparable, consequence" was the probable reason for the
modification of the finality requirement. 348 U.S. 176, 181 (1955) (footnote omitted)
This statute has been expanded to include orders modifying, refusing, or dissolving in-
junctions as well. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) (1970). Other provisions relating to
appeals from certain interlocutory orders in receivership, admiralty, and patent infringe-
ment actions are also contained in § 1292(a). See 9 MOORE f 110.16. Notably, most
of these exceptions are for interlocutory orders that formerly would have been made in
chancery. See Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, supra note 8, at 367.
Since words of restraint or direction can be used in almost any order, courts have gen-
erally read § 1292(a)(1) as applying only to those injunctions granting part or all of
the substantive relief sought by a complaint, and not to those restraining the conduct
of the parties or their counsel in a way unrelated to the substantive issues. International
Prods. Corp. v. Koons, 325 F.2d 403, 406 (2d Cir. 1963), quoted with approval in
Weight Watchers v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455 F.2d 770, 774-75 (2d Cir. 1972).
See generally 9 MooRE % 110.20.
12. Interlocutory Appeals Act of 1958, 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970); see note 5
supra. The Judicial Conference of the United States had recommended enactment of
this statute, relying in part on the report of a committee of the Judicial Conference of
the Tenth Circuit. This report stated: I
[1'he enlargement of the right of appeal should be limited to extraordinary
cases in which ,extended and expensive proceedings probably can be avoided
by immediate final decision of controlling questions encountered early in the
action. The shortening of the period between commencement of an action and
its ultimate termination, together with avoidance of unnecessary work and ex-
pense, are the imperative considerations which impel the committee's recom-
mendation for change in the existing law.
H.R. REP. No. 1667, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1958), reprinting RIPoRT OF CoMM. or
JuDIcAL CONFERENcE OF THE TENTH Cmcurr (1953); see E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown,
305 F. Supp. 371, 403 (S.D. Tex. 1969). See generally 9 MooRE 110.22[1].
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In addition to these statutory exceptions, federal case law also quali-
fied the requirement of a final judgment. Perhaps the most significant
of these qualifications was the "collateral order" rule, based primarily
on Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., 3 in which the Supreme
The appeal is strictly a discretionary one for interlocutory orders--discretionary for
the appellant, the district judge, and the court of appeals. The discretion of the district
judge is limited by the statute to a determination of whether the order involves a "con-
trolling question of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion"
and whether immediate appeal from the order may "materially advance the ultimate
termination of the litigation." See generally 9 MooRE 110.22[2]; Note, Section 1292
(b): Eight Years of Undefined Discretion, 54 GEo. L.J. 940 (1966); Note, supra note
5, at 617-28. At first, courts interpreted § 1292(b) to apply only to exceptional cases
where immediate appeal might "avoid protracted and expensive litigation." Milbert v.
Bison Labs., Inc., 260 F.2d 431, 433 (3d Cir. 1958). An exceptional case is not re-
quired by the language of the section, however, and support for this view is dwindling.
See Note, supra note 5, at 625-27. See generally 9 Mooln 110.22[3].
Courts vary in their use of § 1292(b), from sparing to frequent. Compare Control
Data Corp. v. IBM Corp., 421 F.2d 323, 325 (8th Cir. 1970), and United Barge Co.
v. Logan Charter Serv., Inc., 237 F. Supp. 624, 631 (D. Minn. 1964), with Frist v. Gal-
lant, 240 F. Supp. 827, 830 (W.D.S.C. 1965). In the Fifth Circuit, by "suggesting" that
matters be resubmitted to the district court for redetermination and possible § 1292(b)
crtification, the court of appeals is making the section a vehicle for the exercise of its
mapervisory guidance. Note, Section 1292(b): Eight Years of Undefined Descretion
supra at 959-60; see, e.g., Hadjipateras v. Pacifica, S.A., 290 F.2d 697, 702 (5th Cir.
1961).
Another procedural qualification of the final judgment requirement is FED. P. CIv.
P. 54(b), which allows a district judge to enter a final judgment as to only one claim
where there is more than one claim, or as to only one party where there are multiple
parties, if the judge expressly determines that "there is no just reason for delay .... "
See generally 6 MooRE 54.04[3]; Note, Appealability in the Federal Courts, supra note
8, at 357-63.
13. 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The suit was a shareholder derivative action in which
the corporation, as defendant, moved to require plaintiff to give security for expenses
of the suit, a right provided a defendant corporation by New Jersey law. The district
court denied the motion, finding the state statute inapplicable, and the court of appeals,
ruling on this interlocutory order, reversed. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp. v. Smith, 170
F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1948), rev'g 7 F.R.D. 352 (D.N.J. 1947). Justice Jackson, writing
for the Supreme Court, stated:
When that time [final judgment] comes, it will be too late effectively to re-
view the present order, and the rights conferred by the statute, if it is applica-
ble, will have been lost, probably irreparably....
This decision appears to fall in that small class which finally determine
claims of right separable from, and collateral to, rights asserted in the action,
too important to be denied review and too independent of the cause itself to
require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudi-
cated. The Court has long given this provision of the statute this practical
rather than a technical construction ...
We hold this order appealable because it is a final disposition of a claimed
right which is not an ingredient of the cause of action and does not require
consideration with it.
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Court described a small class of interlocutory orders that were appeal-
able as final judgments. This class consisted of orders meeting the fol-
lowing prerequisites: (1) the order was a final determination of a
claim of right "separable from, and collateral to," the rights asserted
337 U.S. at 546-47. This passage has been quoted in many cases and in innumerable
briefs of counsel to support the appealability of a wide range of interlocutory orders
claimed to be final determinations of important collateral rights.
The Supreme Court has applied Cohen to find various orders appealable. See, e.g.,
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974) (order allocating costs of class action
notice); Stack v. Boyle, 342 U.S. 1 (1951) (order refusing to reduce bail); Roberts v.
United States Dist. Court, 339 U.S. 844 (1950) (order denying prisoner's motion to pro-
ceed in forma pauperis); Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339
U.S. 684, 688-89 (1950) (order vacating attachment on foreign-owned vessel); cf. Mer-
cantile Natl Bank v. Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558 (1963).
Circuit courts have frequently applied the Cohen rule to hold various district court
orders appealable. See, e.g., Garber v. Randell, 477 F.2d 711, 715 (2d Cir. 1973) (or-
der consolidating suits and directing filing of consolidated complaint); Spanos v. Penn
Cent. Transp. Co., 470 F.2d 806 (3d Cir. 1972) (order refusing to appoint counsel in
civil suit); Dickstein v. duPont, 443 F.2d 783 (1st Cir. 1971) (order staying action
pending arbitration); Norman v. McKee, 431 F.2d 769 (9th Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
401 U.S. 912 (1971) (order disapproving class settlement). Relying on Cohen, the Sec-
ond Circuit has developed the "death knell" doctrine, which permits appeal of an order
dismissing a class action if, without review, the order would put an end to the litigation.
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 370 F.2d 119, 120-21 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 386
U.S. 1035 (1967), quoting Chabot v. National Sec. & Research Corp., 290 F.2d 657,
659 (2d Cir. 1961). But cf. Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972). See generally Comment, Appealability of a Class
Action Dismissal, 39 U. Cm. L. REV. 403 (1972).
Many cases have rejected application of the Cohen rule to particular orders. See, e.g.,
Aaacon Auto Transp., Inc. v. Ninfo, 490 F.2d 83 (2d Cir. 1974) (order concerning venue
under § 1404(a) and order staying arbitration); IBM Corp. v. United States, 493 F.2d
112 (2d Cir. 1973) (order finding party in civil contempt); Stans v. Gagliardi, 485 F.2d
1290 (2d Cir. 1973) (order setting trial date); Financial Servs., Inc. v. Ferrandina, 474
F.2d 743 (2d Cir. 1973) (order refusing to vacate attachment); United States v. Fried,
386 F.2d 691 (2d Cir. 1967) (order refusing to quash information subpoena, despite pos-
sible consequences to witness' mental health). See generally 9 MooRE 110.13.
Recent cases have expressed increasing reluctance to give the collateral order rule an
expansive reading, stressing the growing appellate dockets and the undermining of the
final judgment requirement that would result. See Baker v. United States Steel Corp.,
492 F.2d 1074, 1077-78 (2d Cir. 1974); Weight Watchers v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc.,
455 F.2d 770 (2d Cir. 1972); West v. Zurhorst, 425 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1970); Borden
Co. v. Sylk, 410 F.2d 843 (3d Cir. 1969).
Professor Moore has suggested that the Cohen rule should be revoked altogether if
the practice of supervisory mandamus for the review of new, important, and unsettled
questions becomes generally accepted. Moore argues that the rule emerged at a time
when the final judgment rule was inflexible (before § 1292(b) was added) and that
mandamus, which is always discretionary, is preferable to appeal as of right. 9 Mooln
110.10, at 135-36. Nevertheless, the recent Supreme Court decision in Eisen v. Car-
lisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974), effectively refuted any suggestion that the CohenWashington University Open Scholarship
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in the main action; (2) it was "too important to be denied review"; and
(3) appeal after final judgment would be too late to review the order
effectively because the rights conferred would already "have been lost,
probably irreparably." 14  Relying on this collateral order rule, the
Fifth1" and the Third'8 Circuits have held denials'7 of motions to dis-
rule was about to be revoked or replaced. The Eisen Court relied heavily on Cohen
to find an order appealable and did not attempt to limit Cohen in any way.
Another test that has emerged to determine when a decision is final and appealable
is a kind of balancing test, first appearing in Dickinson v. Petroleum Conversion Corp.,
338 U.S. 507 (1950). There the Court referred to the competing considerations of in-
convenience and "costs of piecemeal review on the one hand and the danger of denying
justice by delay on the other." Id. at 511 (footnote omitted). This is sometimes called
the "practical" or "pragmatic" approach. See Brown Shoo Co. v. United States, 370 U.S.
294, 306 (1962). This approach is often used in conjunction with the Cohen rule
to find an order appealable. See, e.g., Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156
(1974). For an extension of this approach to an admittedly "marginal" case involving
a ruling "fundamental to the further conduct of the case," see Gillespie v. United States
Steel Corp., 379 U.S. 148, 153-54 (1964). See generally 9 MooRE 1 110.12; Note, The
Finality and Appealability of Interlocutory Orders, supra note 8, at 1046-47.
14. 337 U.S. at 546-47, quoted in note 13 supra. The prerequisites, as stated, are
those commonly recognized by Second Circuit cases. See, e.g., IBM Corp. v. United
States, 471 F.2d 507, 513-14 (2d Cir. 1972), rev'd on rehearing en banc, 480 F.2d 293
(2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 980 (1974) (reversed on ground that these pre-
requisites of Cohen were not satisfied); cf. 9 MOORE I 110.10, at 133.
15. Tomlinson v. Florida Iron & Metal, Inc., 291 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1961) involved
representation by a former government attorney that the court of appeals found violated
the Act of June 1, 1872, ch. 256, § 5, 17 Stat. 202 (now 18 U.S.C. § 207 (1970)).
The court reached the merits after determining, in reliance on Cohen, that the district
court's order denying disqualification was appealable. The disqualification issue was
"'entirely disconnected with the principal contention .. in the pending suit,'" and the
order constituted a "'final decision on that ancillary matter."' Id. at 334, quoting Tom-
linson v. Paller, 220 F.2d 308, 311 (5th Cir. 1955). The harm resulting from a possi-
ble error in the order would frustrate the public policy expressed by the statute; any ap-
peal taken after the trial in which the attorney had participated would neither avoid nor
mitigate the harm. 291 F.2d at 334.
In Uniweld Prods., Inc. v. Union Carbide Corp., 385 F.2d 992 (5th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 390 U.S. 921 (1968), the court summarily held appealable, on the basis of Tom-
linson v. Florida Iron & Metal, Inc., supra, an order denying a motion to disqualify, al-
though only ethical considerations of conflict of interest were involved. See also United
States v. Trafficante, 328 F.2d 117 (5th Cir. 1964).
16. In an unreported decision, Greene v. Singer Co., Civil No. 1835 (3d Cir., Nov.
2, 1971), the court held that an order denying disqualification was appealable under the
collateral order rule enunciated in Cohen. The court emphasized that requiring the ap-
pellant to await final judgment to appeal the order would deny appellant "the reality
of appellate processes," and the law could provide no practical remedy if confidential
information were disclosed or used by the attorney. "Conversely.. .the possibility of
irreparable injury would be substantially lessened" if there was an immediate appeal. Id.
at 3. The court limited its holding, noting that not every ruling about a conflict of inter-
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss1/16
220 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [Vol. 1975:212
qualify opposing trial counsel final and appealable. In contrast, the
Ninth Circuit has held these orders not directly appealable.18
Faced with this conflict among the circuits, 19 including precedent in
its own circuit that denials of motions to disqualify were not directly
appealable,20 the Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit reexamined
est by an attorney could "activate the Cohen rule"; the rights asserted here were too
important and too independent to require postponement of appellate consideration.
17. Orders granting motions to disqualify counsel have long been assumed to be im-
mediately appealable. See, e.g., Brown v. Miller, 286 F. 994 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (attorney
himself appealing order, leaving plaintiff's suit pending). Generally jurisdiction is as-
sumed without comment. -See, e.g., American Can Co. v. Citrus Feed Co., 436 F.2d
1125 (5th Cir. 1971); W.E. Bassett Co. v. H.C. Cook Co., 302 F.2d 268 (2d Cir. 1962).
Where considered, jurisdiction for appeal has been upheld with little comment. See
Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 469 F.2d 1382, 1383 (3d Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
411 U.S. 986 (1973); Fleischer v. Phillips, 264 F.2d 515, 516 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
359 U.S. 1002 (1959), cited ivith approval in Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478
F.2d 562, 570 n.5 (2d Cir. 1973). But cf. United States v. Hankish, 462 F.2d 316 (4th
Cir. 1972).
18. Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1964). Without specifically referring
to the collateral order rule or the final judgment requirement, the court noted its agree-
ment with earlier Second Circuit cases, see cases cited note 20 infra, holding orders
denying disqualification motions unappealable. Although the appellant in Cord had not
obtained a § 1292(b) statement from the district judge, the court noted the possibility of
such action as one reason for rejecting appellant's argument that the order was appeal-
able as a denial of an injunction under § 1292(a). 338 F.2d at 521; see notes 3, 11,
12 supra. Nevertheless, the court found that this was an appropriate time to treat the
matter as a petition for a writ:
Continued participation as an attorney, by one who is disqualified by conflict
of interest from so doing, will bring about the very evil which the rule against
his participation is designed to prevent, and a subsequent reversal based upon
such participation cannot undo the damage that will have been done as a result
of such participation. We therefore proceed to the merits.
338 F.2d at 521-22. Following Cord v. Smith, the court in Chugach Elec. Ass'n v.
United States Dist. Court, 370 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 820
(1967), used a writ of mandamus method to review an order denying disqualification
of counsel.
19. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit has
noted this conflict concerning appealability of denials of motions to disqualify when dis-
qualification was sought on ethical considerations alone. Yablonski v. United Mine
Workers, 454 F.2d 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972). In Ya-
blonski, however, the court found that the conflicting obligations of union counsel were
a "significant impingement on a specific legislative policy," expressed in the Labor-
Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970). 454
F.2d at 1038 n.9. Therefore, the court assumed jurisdiction over an appeal from a dis-
qualification order. Id. at 1038 & n.9, citing Tomlinson v. Florida Iron & Metal, Inc.,
291 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1961); see note 15 supra.
20. Marco v. Dulles, 268 F.2d 192 (2d Cir. 1959); Fleischer v. Phillips, 264 F,2d
515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959).
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en banc the appealability question in Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v.
Chrysler Motors Corp.2' In a unanimous opinion, Judge Moore dis-
cussed extensively the development of appealability of disqualification
orders in the Second Circuit. He found that appealability, based on
Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., was definitely established
in the circuit from the time of that decision in 1949 until 1959.22
During this time, the court, without discussing appealability, accepted
appeals from three orders granting disqualification and one order deny-
ing disqualification;23 in one case, Harmar Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v.
Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.,24 the court explicitly held that a denial was
appealable. In 1959, however, in Fleischer v. Phillips,5 the court re-
21. 496 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1974).
22. Id. at 803. It should be noted, however, that all of the cases taking appeals
from orders granting or denying disqualification during this time interval were concen-
trated in the years from 1954 to 1956. Cohen itself did not involve a disqualification
order, but rather a denial of security. See note 13 supra.
23. Fisher Studio, Inc. v. Loew's Inc., 232 F.2d 199 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S.
836 (1956) (appeal from order disqualifying attorney); Laskey Bros., Inc. v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc. (Austin Theatre, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc.), 224 F.2d 824
(2d Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 932 (1956), noted in 3 U.C.L.A.L. REv. 105
(1955); Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Mgmt. Corp., 216 F.2d 920
(2d Cir. 1954) (appeal from order disqualifying attorney), noted in 68 HIv. L. Rv.
1085 (1955), 6 SYRAcusE L. REv. 360 (1955), and 64 Yt. LJ. 917 (1955). Laskey
and Austin were consolidated for appeal because they involved the same law firm, but
Laskey was an appeal from a disqualification order while Austin was from a denial of
disqualification. Both orders were affirmed on the merits with no discussion of appeal-
ability, Judge Clark writing the majority opinion. In dictum in Fisher, Judge Clark re-
ferred to the collateral nature of the disqualification order.
24. 239 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 824 (1957). Writing for
the majority, Judge Swan found the order appealable. No distinction as to appealability
existed between orders granting and orders denying disqualification; both were within
the small class of appealable orders described in Cohen. Id. at 556; see notes 13 & 14
mrupra and accompanying text. Chief Judge Clark dissented, however, finding a denial
of disqualification "quite interlocutory" and therefore not appealable. 239 F.2d at 557.
According to Judge Clark, a denial lacked finality since a district judge could still dis-
qualify the attorney at any time if more convincing evidence were presented; therefore
Cohen was inapplicable. Id. at 557-58. Judge Clark also noted that if there was any
basis for the disqualification claim, the confidential information would probably have
been disclosed and used already so that there was no immediate need to stop the attorney
from further disclosure. Id. at 558 n.3.
25. 264 F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002 (1959). Chief Judge Clark
first stated that the request to enjoin a firm from representing defendants was equivalent
to a request to disqualify so that the denial did not render the order appealable under
§ 1292(a)(1) as a denial of an injunction. Id. at 516; see note 11 supra. Judge Clark
distinguished between orders granting and orders denying disqualification, not only as
to their finality, see note 24 supra, but also as to their results:
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jected the earlier approach of Harmar and held that denials of disquali-
fication were not appealable; Judge Moore wrote a vigorous dissent.
Faced with an appeal from a similar order later that year, another Sec-
ond Circuit panel felt "constrained" by Fleischer to dismiss the ap-
peal. 26
After examining the more recent cases from other circuits indicating
a trend toward allowing immediate review of orders denying disquali-
fication, the court concluded that Cohen required "a return to the wis-
dom of Harmar" and therefore overruled Fleischer.17  The court justi-
An order granting disqualification seriously disrupts the progress of the litiga-
tion and decisively sullies the reputation of the affected attorney; but one re-
fusing such relief merely allows the action to proceed and has no permanent
effect of any kind.
264 F.2d at 517. District Judge Gibson, concurring in Judge Clark's opinion, added that
review of denials of disqualification would set back the cause of "just, speedy and inex-
pensive justice." Id. at 518, quoting FED. R. Civ. P. 1.
Relying on the enactment of § 1292(b) in 1958, Chief Judge Clark did not feel bound
by the contrary decision in Harmar. He noted that the Judicial Conference of the
United States, while preparing its § 1292(b) proposal, had revealed that a majority of
federal judges disfavored the trial supervision implicit in the general use of interlocutory
appeals. Id. at 517. See also Note, supra note 5, at 610-12. Therefore, Judge Clark
felt that the provision in § 1292(b) of limited areas for review manifested the "desirabil-
ity of maintaining the settled federal principle against piecemeal appeals .... " 264
F.2d at 517.
Judge Moore, dissenting, believed the order was appealable. If there was any viola-
tion of ethics that might "taint the entire proceeding this possibility should be tested at
the threshold." Id. Finding that the issue of disqualification was wholly collateral, that
the merits of that issue would not be merged in a final judgment of the underlying case,
and that there was a final disposition of a right "not an ingredient of the cause of ac-
tion," Judge Moore thought the order was within the class of appealable orders described
in Cohen. Id. at 518-19. Dismissal of the appeal would cause difficulties in determin-
ing the admissibility of evidence, confusion due to the diversity of issues in a possible
future appeal, and a waste of time if the trial judgment were later reversed solely because
the attorneys should have been disqualified. Id.
26. Marco v. Dulles, 268 F.2d 192, 193 (2d Cir. 1959). Judge Swan, who had also
written the majority opinion in Harmar, stated that Fleischer demonstrated that an order
denying disqualification was interlocutory and not appealable without compliance with
§ 1292(b). Id. at 193. Judge Moore dissented.
More recently, Fleischer was held to require dismissal of an appeal from a denial of
defendant's motion to enjoin a nonlawyer claimant from acting pro se in a stockholder's
derivative suit. Willheim v. Murchison, 312 F.2d 399 (2d Cir. 1963), dismissing appeal
from 206 F. Supp. 733 (S.D.N.Y. 1962). This was the first Second Circuit case involv-
ing a denial of "counsel" disqualification on a basis other than conflict of interest due
to former employment. The court's failure to attempt to distinguish this case from
Fleischer showed apparent unwillingness to limit the Fleischer holding. See also In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 318 F.2d 533, 537-38 (2d Cir. 1963).
27. 496 F.2d at 805-06. Before considering the precedents, see notes 15-19 & 24-26
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fled overruling Fleischer by noting the inadequate basis for distinguish-
ing between orders granting disqualification (the appealability of which
had long been assumed in the Second Circuit) and orders denying dis-
qualification. 28  Both orders met all three prerequisites for appeal-
ability given in Cohen.2 9  In addition, the court noted that allowing im-
mediate appeal of denials of disqualification would produce two desir-
able results: elimination of uncertainty about whether review could be
obtained through the writ method3° or under section 1292(b) without
a statutory statement by the district judge;3 1 and resolution of the ques-
tion of disqualification at the outset "lest a costly and protracted trial
be tainted on the merits by an issue collateral thereto. 3 2  Because the
order met the prerequisites of Cohen, and since the court perceived
only beneficial results in permitting appeal, the court followed the
"mandate" of Cohen and held that any order denying disqualification
of counsel was directly appealable.
supra, the court had quoted extensively from Cohen, the case that the court said could
"be taken as the cornerstone." 496 F.2d at 802. Because the court overruled Fleischer,
it also had to overrule Marco v. Dulles, which had followed Fleischer. See note 26
supra and accompanying text.
28. 496 F.2d at 805. Compare Chief Judge Clark's contrary view, discussed in note
25 supra, that an adequate ground existed for distinguishing between the two kinds of
orders. For cases holding that orders granting disqualification are appealable, see note
17 supra.
The Second Circuit recently faced a similar problem in deciding whether orders grant-
ing class action status should be appealable if the denial of such status would be. See
Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 479 F.2d 1005, 1007 n.1 (2d Cir. 1973). There is, how-
ever, no rule that if one action taken on an order is appealable, the opposite action is
also appealable. Compare Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Columbiana Del Caribe,
339 U.S. 684, 688-89 (1950) (order vacating attachment is appealable), with West v. Zur-
horst, 425 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1970) (order refusing to vacate attachment not appeal-
able). See also Shattuck v. Hoegl, Civil No. 74-1767 (2d Cir., July 16, 1975) (Moore,
J. concurring).
In an apparent effort to make the overruling of Fleischer rest at least partially on
the passage of time and changed circumstances, the court also noted the change in the
court makeup and the change in the structure of large metropolitan law firms since 1959.
496 F.2d at 803.
29. See note 14 supra and accompanying text.
30. See notes 6 & 18 supra.
31. See note 5 supra.
32. 496 F.2d at 803. The concern over a "costly and protracted trial" is reminiscent
of the exceptional case doctrine under § 1292(b), which the Second Circuit has used
frequently for the "big" cases. See 9 MooRE 110.22[3]; note 12 supra. Plaintiff's
attorneys, however, considered the underlying case to be a "small case" which would
take only a day or two to dispose of. Supp. Mem. for Appellee at 21, Silver Chrysler
Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 496 F.2d 800 (1974).
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Although exhaustive in its canvass of appeals involving denials of
disqualification, the court reached its result with deceptive ease. The
court's treatment of precedent creates an illusion that all of the circuits
permit immediate review of such orders. While it is true that the Ninth
Circuit has used the writ approach to effect much the same result as
an appeal's and that the Fifth Circuit seems to have accepted appeal-
ability without reservation,8 4 the Third Circuit has manifested a disposi-
tion not to allow appeals from every order involving disqualification,"8
and the District of Columbia" and Fourth 7 Circuits have not actually
committed themselves to a position. Further, the court implied that
Fleischer was a mere aberration, Judge Clark having led the court away
from the true path of Cohen. In fact, there was no prior established
policy of allowing appeal of orders denying disqualification. 8
More disturbing than fhe court's misleading treatment of precedent
is its failure to explain under what circumstances the Cohen rule will
be applied in the future. Rather than stating why the order was
deemed final or collateral 9 or why it involved an important question,40
33. See note 18 supra.
34. See note 15 supra.
35. See note 16 supra; cf. Hackett v. General Host Corp., 455 F.2d 618 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 407 U.S. 925 (1972) (refusing to extend Greene v. Singer Co., Civil No.
1835 (3d Cir., Nov. 2, 1971), into other areas).
36. See note 19 supra.
37. The Fourth Circuit case cited by the court, United States v. Hankish, 462 F.2d
316 (4th Cir. 1972), is certainly not precedent for the appealability of denials of dis-
qualification, since the case itself involved an order granting disqualification in a crimi-
nal trial. Nor. is it precedent for the appealability of a grant of disqualification, since
the court equivocated on the appealability of such an order. See id. at 318-19.
38. See note 22 supra. Only Harmar had so held. Since § 1292(b) was enacted
after Harmar and before Fleischer, Judge Clark might reasonably have assumed that the
availability of § 1292(b) made it unnecessary to consider denials final and appealable.
See note 25 supra. Interestingly, § 1292(b) was based on a statute that Judge Clark
himself had proposed in an. effort to restrict the scope of appeals suggested by earlier
proposals. See H.R. REp. No. 1667, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1958).
After the Fleischer decision, courts felt that the Second Circuit had taken a definite
position refusing immediate appeal of orders denying disqualification. If there was any
established policy at all regarding appealability, it was that appealability would be de-
nied. See, e.g., Cord v. Smith, 338 .F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1964); Marco v. Dulles,
268 F.2d 192, 193 (2d Cir. 1959). Professor Moore found the Second Circuit's ap-
proach denying the applicability of the Cohen rule clearly preferable to allowing appeal
under Cohen. 9 MooPn 110.13[10].
39. Judge Clark's principal basis for distinguishing between grants and denials of
motions to disqualify had been the lack of finality of a denial since a judge could recon-
sider the order whenever presented with new evidence which might justify disqualifica-
tion. See notes 24 & 25 supra. But cf. Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 496 F.2d 1094,
224
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the court simply stated its conclusions with quotations from Cohen.
Similarly, the court relied on the favorable results of allowing im-
mediate review, but ne-' acted to explain why this policy consideration
1097 (2d Cir. 1974) (alt gh sometimes held final and appealable, neither grant nor
denial of class standing w "'final" order); MacAlister v. Guterma, 263 F.2d 65, 70 (2d
Cir. 1958) (denial of co ddation held final and appealable, although court of appeals
affirmed denial order w .out prejudice to any further application to district court for
consolidation order). In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 172 (1974), the
Supreme Court found that an order which imposed on defendant 90% of the notice costs
for plaintiff's class action was final because the order conclusively rejected defendant's
contention that it could not lawfully be required to bear this expense. The Court found
Cohen controlling, noting that the order in Cohen was not "tentative, informal or incom-
plete"; rather, the Cohen order had conclusively settled the corporation's claim for secu-
rity and "concerned a collateral matter that could not be reviewed effectively on appeal
from the final judgment." Id. at 172.
Similarly, an order denying disqualification is not normally tentative or incomplete,
even though it is not irrevocable. The district judge generally has a voluminous record
of affidavits or hearing testimony from which to make his determination of disqualifica-
tion; it is unlikely that he will change his mind and later order disqualification upon
the presentation of new evidence unless the attorney subsequently acts in a manner
clearly requiring his disqualification. Often the record is one prepared by a special
master to whom the district court has referred the matter for findings of fact. See, e.g.,
Consolidated Theatres, Inc. v. Warner Bros. Circuit Mgmt. Corp., 216 F.2d 920 (2d Cir.
1954). When adopted by the trial court, these findings and the subsequent order are
certainly not tentative or informal. Any finality they lack is compensated by the irrep-
arable nature of any injury caused by disclosure of lawyer-client confidences; in other
words, the matter is one which could not be effectively reviewed after final judgment.
A successful appeal then would be only a "hollow victory" since the breach of confi-
dence would already have occurred and little could be done to repair that breach. See
Swift & Co. Packers v. Compania Colombiana Del Caribe, 339 U.S. 684, 689 (1950);
Peterson v. Nadler, 452 F.2d 754 (8th Cir. 1971); Glaser v. North Am. Uranium & Oil
Corp., 222 F.2d 552, 554 (2d Cir. 1955). Although a lack of drastic consequences from
an order may persuade a court that the order is not appealable, see, e.g., Weight Watch-
ers v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455 F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1972), serious conse-
quences alone are insufficient to make an order final and appealable, see Stans v.
Gagliardi, 485 F.2d 1290, 1292 (2d Cir. 1973).
For a discussion of the various definitions of "collateral", see Note, Appealability in
the Federal Courts, supra note 8, at 365. Not even Judge Clark ever denied that dis-
qualification orders are collateral to the main action, the controversy in such orders be-
ing primarily between the former client and attorney. This tangentiality to the main
action was further illustrated in Silver Chrysler by Hammond and Schreiber's statement
to the district court that they were litigating the disqualification issues at their own ex-
pense. Supp. Mem. for Appellants at 5, Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Mo-
tors Corp., 496 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1974).
40. Cohen refers to a determination of a claim of right "too important to be denied
review . . . ." 337 U.S. at 546. Professor Moore thinks that "important" should be
interpreted as requiring a serious and unsettled question of general importance beyond
the immediate concern of the particular litigants. See 9 MooRE 110.10, at 133. Co-
hen and subsequent cases, however, appear more concerned with the importance of the
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was sufficient to cause the court to depart from a general policy against
reading Cohen expansively and allowing piecemeal appeals.4 For ex-
claimed right to the litigant than with its general import *e. -See C. Wuorrr, HAND-
Boor oF THE LAw OF FEDERAL CouRTs § 101, at 452, 456 1 ed. 1970). But cf. Katz
v. Realty Equities Corp., Civil Nos. 74-2053, -2054 (2d Cir. une 30, 1975). In noting
the kinds of orders which have been treated as "final" und( he Cohen rule, Professor
Wright quoted a test from a case that he believed stated the,* v of the Supreme Court:
"'-[Al order, otherwise nonappealable, determining substaLrial rights of the parties
which will be irreparably lost if review is delayed until final judgment may be appealed
immediately under section 1291.'" C. WiGrr, supra, § 101, at 456, quoting United
States v. Wood, 295 F.2d 772, 778 (5th Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 850 (1962).
In West v. Zurhorst, 425 F.2d 919 (2d Cir. 1970), the court held an order refusing
to vacate an attachment not appealable. Although the court agreed that the grievance
created by an improper attachment was "important," it was "not important enough to
make the decision 'final"' under Cohen. Id. at 921. The Second Circuit has indicated,
however, that "whether a decision will settle a point once and for all... or will open
the way for a flood of appeals concerning the propriety of a district court's ruling" is
a factor in deciding whether the Cohen doctrine should be applied. Weight Watchers
v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455 F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1972); accord, IBM Corp.
v. United States, 480 F.2d 293, 298 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 980 (1974).
41. In West v. Zurhorst, 425 F.2d 919, 921 (2d Cir. 1970), the court stated:
The increase in the burden on the courts of appeals in the last decade ...
hardly suggest [sic] the desirability of an expansive reading of Cohen, even if
controlling decisions left us freer in that respect than we think.
In Weight Watchers v. Weight Watchers Int'l, Inc., 455 F.2d 770, 773 (2d Cir. 1972),
the court said: "We have often indicated that Cohen must be kept within narrow
bounds, lest this exception swallow the salutary 'final judgment' rule." In Baker v.
United States Steel Corp., 492 F.2d 1074, 1077 (2d Cir. 1974), the court again empha-
sized its strong policy against interlocutory appeals.
The court in Silver Chrysler briefly considered Weight Watchers, Baker, and other
cases finding orders not appealable, but distinguished them all because they did not in-
volve disqualification and lacked one or another of the Cohen prerequisites. 496 F.2d
at 805. Obviously, however, the appellee was citing these cases for the general policy
stated in them of discouraging interlocutory appeals, and the court did not address this
rationale.
In Baker, the district court had ordered disclosure of grand jury transcripts from an
earlier indictment filed against the defendants involving the same charges asserted in the
pending civil suit. The court of appeals noted the harm that could result if the order
were erroneous since, once disclosed, the transcripts could not be restored to secrecy.
This disclosure would affect not only the defendants, but also the public interest in the
confidentiality of grand jury proceedings. Nevertheless, the court found itself powerless
to accept appeal of this interlocutory order, although it did suggest that the district court
reconsider its order in light of the court of appeals' opinion. 492 F.2d at 1078-79.
In IBM Corp. v. United States, 480 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. dented, 416 U.S.
980 (1974), the court of appeals, sitting en banc, found unappealable a discovery order
requiring the disclosure of documents IBM claimed were within the attorney-client privi-
lege. An alternative ground for finding the order unappealable was that Cohen was in-
applicable, partly because it was a discovery order that was at issue and partly because
any error that had been committed "did not rise to the magnitude appropriate for...
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ample, the court emphasized the uncertainty involved in attempting to
appeal a denial of disqualification.4  This consideration, however, is
not persuasive since it applies to appeals of any order presently re-
garded as unappealable. Although the court's concern with avoiding
the possibility of a trial tainted on the merits by an order erroneously
refusing to disqualify a party's counsel is valid, it should not be disposi-
tive. The possibility of prejudicial error is not a sufficient basis for
immediate appeal. 43
a Cohen appeal . . . ." Id. at 298-99. Judge Moore, dissenting with Judge Timbers,
emphasized the historical importance of the attorney-client privilege and the inability to
remedy after final judgment any harm that would have resulted from forced disclosure.
Id. at 299-303. If Judge Moore thought the injury there was irreparable, his conclusion
in Silver Chrysler that the injury from a denial of disqualification was irreparable was
certainly foreseeable. Yet, in Silver Chrysler, Judge Moore gave no reason why the
other Second Circuit judges felt that disqualification proceedings were distinguishable
from the discovery order in IBM.
This failure to distinguish disqualification proceedings may make Silver Chrysler a dif-
ficult case for litigants to rely on. The opinion does not evince a strong federal policy
against allowing interlocutory appeals, and one would presume the court would thereafter
apply Cohen liberally to achieve "practical" results and avoid the uncertainties and pa-
perwork involved in resort to § 1292(b) and § 1651, at least when the question, "if unre-
solved, might well taint a trial.. .. " 496 F.2d at 806. The litigant wishing to appeal,
however, will have difficulty pointing to any standard the court actually used except the
tests of Cohen itself. In effect, the court merely stated its conclusion that denials of
disqualification satisfied the Cohen prerequisites. Even the standards in quoted state-
ments from other courts were never expressly endorsed. Although this case may in fact
indicate a new trend toward reading Cohen broadly, the opinion is so written that the
court can distinguish the case whenever it desires by simply pointing to the statement
that cases involving other kinds of orders were not authority for the unappealability of
denials of disqualification, id. at 805, and by concluding that disqualification proceedings
are peculiar. In a recent case involving an order denying disqualification, the court cited
Silver Chrysler as authority for its jurisdiction to review the order and stated that "such
an interlocutory order falls within the narrow confines of permissible appeals under the
collateral order doctrine." General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639,
644 (2d Cir. 1974).
42. 496 F.2d at 801, 806.
43. See, e.g., Baker v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F.2d 1074, 1078-79 (2d Cir.
1974). The relative frequency of reversals of orders denying disqualification is, how-
ever, a consideration in determining appealability. -See Donlon Indus., Inc. v. Forte, 402
F.2d 935, 937 (2d Cir. 1968). Orders denying disqualification were reversed in the fol-
lowing cases: General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (2d Cir. 1974)
(jurisdiction to review based on Silver Chrysler); Yablonski v. United Mine Workers,
454 F.2d 1036 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 906 (1972); Chugach Elec.
Ass'n v. United States Dist. Court, 370 F.2d 441 (9th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S.
820 (1967); Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1964); Tomlinson v. Florida Iron
& Metal, Inc., 291 F.2d 333 (5th Cir. 1961); Harmar Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Warner
Bros. Pictures, Inc., 239 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 824 (1957);
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The most compelling reason for the court's result lies in the finding
that the third requirement of Cohen was met, that is, that review after
final judgment cannot provide adequate relief if an attorney who should
have been disqualified for conflict of interest is allowed to participate
in the case. By the time final judgment is rendered, any harm that
the rule prohibiting participation seeks to prevent will already have oc-
curred.44 Although some harm to the former client may occur before
the motion to disqualify counsel is filed, the further injury caused by
General Contract Purchase Corp. v. Armour, 125 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1942); United
States v. Bishop, 90 F.2d 65 (6th Cir. 1937). Armour and Bishop were presented on
appeal from final judgment. In both, the denial of disqualification was considered preju-
dicial error, although in each case there was another basis for reversal. A new trial
may or may not be required, depending on the other grounds for reversal. The court
in Bishop did require a new trial.
Generally, it seems that when a litigant waits to appeal until after a final judgment,
the appellate court summarily passes over the disqualification issue. This suggests that
an appellate court may be more willing to reverse the lower court and disqualify an at-
torney who may possess relevant confidential information when the suit is in its incipi-
ence than on appeal after a trial, when the court possesses the whole record and can
judge whether the former client was in fact prejudiced. Compare Chugach Elec. Ass'n
v. United States Dist. Court, supra, and Harmar Drive-In Theatre, Inc. v. Warner Bros.
Pictures, Inc., supra, with Autowest, Inc. v. Peugeot, Inc., 434 F.2d 556, 567-68 (2d Cir.
1970), Lucom v. Atlantic Nat'l Bank, 354 F.2d 51, 56 (5th Cir. 1965), and Pioche
Mines Consol., Inc. v. Dolman, 333 F.2d 256, 265 (9th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380
U.S. 956 (1965). In Herbst v. ITT Corp., 495 F.2d 1308, 1313 (2d Cir. 1974), the
court candidly admitted to this discrepancy in its willingness to reverse orders authoriz-
ing class actions, depending on the time when appeal was taken. The Herbst court,
while acknowledging the large numbers of class actions pending in the Second Circuit,
believed that immediate review of class action authorizations, before large amounts of
time and money were expended in managing the class actions, would be desirable and
would be a valid exercise of its "supervisory powers over the administration of justice
in the district courts." Id. at 1313; cf. General Motors Corp. v. City of New York,
supra at 659 (concurring opinion). But see id. at 644 n.12 (majority opinion).
Undoubtedly, it is equally important for the court to exercise its supervision of district
courts with respect to disqualification of lawyers, especially in view of the rate of rever-
sals of orders denying disqualification and the importance the court attaches to high
standards for lawyer representation. See generally Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc.,
478 F.2d 562 (2d Cir. 1973) (considerations involved in determining disqualification).
44. See notes 15, 39, 41 supra. Chrysler's position was not that any ethical breach
had yet occurred, but that a potential breach could be prevented from occurring by dis-
qualification of Hammond & Schreiber. Supp. Mem. for Appellants at 10-12, Silver
Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 496 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1974). Ham-
mond & Schreiber in turn countered that the question of disqualification was a factual
determination for the trial judge, Supp. Mem. for Appellee at 16-17, Silver Chrysler Ply-
mouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., supra, and that Judge Weinstein, after a thorough
hearing, had found disqualification unwarranted, id. at 21-22. See generally 9 MOORE
1110.13[10), at 190,
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delay of appeal is not limited to the moving party or even to the party
employing the challenged counsel.45  The failure to adjudicate the at-
torney's qualification immediately and finally also inhibits public confi-
dence in the attorney-client relationship. Allowing the appearance of
impropriety to pervade the proceeding, even if no impropriety in fact
exists, undermines the public's faith in the elements of the American
judicial process-the judge and the lawyer.46  If public confidence is
as important as courts ruling on the merits of disqualification motions
have declared it to be,' then the final resolution of these issues de-
45. Both parties will, of course, incur excessive delay and expense if a new trial is
eventually required. In addition, the suspicion and distrust between the parties will be
heightened because of the lack of finality of the disqualification ruling. Further a judge
will have greater difficulty in ruling on the admissibility of evidence. Fleischer v. Phil-
lips, 264 F.2d 515, 519 (2d Cir.) (dissenting opinion), cert. denied, 359 U.S. 1002
(1959). In Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 571 (2d Cir. 1973), the
court referred to the problems of a lawyer who, charged with a conflict of interests, re-
mains as counsel in the suit:
[Ojut of an excess of good faith, a lawyer might bend too far in the opposite
direction, refraining from seizing a legitimate opportunity for fear that such
a tactic might give rise to an appearance of impropriety.
46. In Emle Indus., Inc. v. Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 570-71 (2d Cir. 1973),
the court stated:
Without strict enforcement of such high ethical standards, a client would
hardly be inclined to discuss his problems freely and in depth with his lawyer,
for he would justifiably fear that information he reveals to his lawyer on one
day may be used against him on the next. A lawyer's good faith, although
essential, is, nevertheless, an inadequate safeguard when standing alone. Even
the most rigorous self-discipline might not prevent a lawyer from unconsciously
using or manipulating a confidence acquired in the earlier representation and
transforming it into a telling advantage in the subsequent litigation. . .. The
dynamics of litigation are far too subtle, the attorney's role in that process is
far too critical, and the public's interest in the outcome is far too great to leave
room for even the slightest doubt concerning the ethical propriety of a lawyer's
representation in a given case.
The court must "exercise its leadership to insure that nothing, not even the appearance
of impropriety, is permitted to tarnish our judicial process." Id. at 575. Compare
Canon 9 of the American Bar Association's Code of Professional Responsibility (1969):
"A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety."
47. For expressions of the importance of public confidence, see General Motors
Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 644 (2d Cir. 1974); Emle Indus., Inc. v.
Patentex, Inc., 478 F.2d 562, 570-71, 575 (2d Cir. 1973); Rosen v. Sugarman, 357 F.2d
794, 796-97 (2d Cir. 1966); W.E. Bassett Co. v. H.C. Cook Co., 302 F.2d 268 (2d
Cir.), aff'g per curiam 201 F. Supp. 821 (D. Conn. 1962); E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown,
305 F. Supp. 371, 395 (S.D. Tex. 1969). The Rosen court found that early review of
a judge's refusal to disqualify himself was both in the interest of preserving public confi-
dence in the courts and in the interest of proper administration of justice. The court
found review by writ of mandamus preferable, however, to a direct appeal for the dis-
qualification of a judge.
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mands immediate attention by the appellate courts. It is this concern
with the public interest that differentiates orders denying disqualifica-
tion from other orders which, though equally important to the parties,
are not directly appealable.
This consideration of public confidence seems to be the only valid
reason for the Silver Chrysler court's decision to allow appeal of all
denials, especially since the court had at least two alternatives that
would have enabled it to control the number of appeals and still take
into account its stated reasons for allowing appeal. For example, if
the potential harm to an individual litigant were the decisive factor, the
court could have expressly limited the right of appeal from denials to
cases involving serious ethical questions.48 If resolution of important
questions of law at the outset of a trial were the primary consideration,
the court could have combined certification under section 1292(b)
with the mandamus approach. 49  That is, if a district judge refused to
48. The court has required a case-by-case analysis in certain other situations in
which the Cohen rule has been applied. See, e.g., Kohn v. Royall, Koegel & Wells, 496
F.2d 1094 (2d Cir. 1974) (orders denying or granting class action status); Garber v.
Randell, 477 F.2d 711, 716 (2d Cir. 1973) (consolidation and severance orders appeal-
able if they deny party's due process right to prosecute his own claims or defenses with-
out having them merged into claims of others). Compare In re Biaggi, 478 F.2d 489,
491 (2d Cir. 1973) (order directing release of grand jury minutes is "obviously appeal-
able"), with Baker v. United States Steel Corp., 492 F.2d 1074, 1078 (2d Cir. 1974)
(similar order found unappealable; Biaggi distinguished on ground that no other relief
was sought there and review of order after final judgment would have been impossible).
But see id. at 1080-81 (Lumbard, J., dissenting). Decisions like Baker show the court's
reluctance to introduce a case-by-case approach into the area of discovery orders out of
fear that the courts would be swamped with interlocutory appeals. Although Judge
Moore, in Silver Chrysler, frankly admitted that "[c]harges of conflict of interest and
motions to disqualify will probably increase rather than abate," 496 F.2d at 803, appeals
of denials of disqualification would amount to only a small fraction of the number of
appeals that discovery orders could generate.
49. Professor Moore has endorsed the combination of these approaches. 9 MooRE
110.11, at 135-36; id. 110.13[10], at 190. For a discussion of § 1292(b), see notes
5 & 12 supra. Several courts of appeals have suggested the use of § 1292(b) for orders
denying disqualification. E.g., Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516, 521 (9th Cir. 1964);
Marco v. Dulles, 268 F.2d 192, 193 (2d Cir. 1959). The district court in E.F. Hutton
& Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371 (S.D. Tex. 1969), certified an appeal from its order
disqualifying plaintiff's counsel and, in a supplemental memorandum, examined the cer-
tification question at length. The court found that, when counsel was disqualified, de-
laying appeal until after final judgment would render the order moot, but plaintiff would
have incurred the delay of finding new counsel and the expense of giving the new attor-
ney the time necessary to digest the files already amassed by the disqualified counsel.
In this sense an appeal "[would] not significantly retard, and may materially advance
the prosecution of this litigation." Id. at 403. Although Judge Noel stated he was
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certify the order for immediate appeal, 5° an appellate court could re-
view the order on a petition for mandamus if the order showed a pos-
sible abuse of power by the trial judge, or the question raised was a
novel and substantial one, or the trial court had applied a new or dif-
ferent standard requiring immediate review.51 The certification-or-
firmly convinced that there should be a disqualification in that case, he found there was
ground for difference of opinion, especially since commentators disagreed on several of
the questions involved. The parties themselves, as well as attorneys and prospective liti-
gants generally, were entitled to have a definitive ruling on the problem of professional
ethics presented by the case. In summation, Judge Noel stated:
Interlocutory appeals are luxuries which litigants and the judicial system can
seldom afford, but the Court feels that in this case, a denial of an interlocutory
appeal would prove even more costly.
Id.
At least one district court has certified an order denying disqualification of counsel,
but the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, after first granting the petition for ap-
peal under § 1292(b), dismissed the appeal as improvidently granted. Waters v. West-
ern Co. of N. America, 436 F.2d 1072 (10th Cir. 1971). The opinion contains strong
language that the control of attorneys in trial litigation is a matter within the discretion
of the trial judge, and that the exercise of this discretion will not normally be disturbed
on appeal. Nevertheless, the court's initial granting of the petition to appeal indicates
that it would be willing to entertain appeals of orders involving serious conflicts of in-
terest. Here, after petition for appeal was granted, the court found that there was no
proper trial record of the issue and that co-counsel for plaintiff disagreed on whether
appeal under § 1292(b) should be taken. The court did not discuss whether the order
might be directly appealable under § 1291, although its silence on this question, as well
as its dismissal of appeal under § 1292(b), might indicate that the court believed the
order was not directly appealable. For an excellent discussion of § 1292, its legislative
history, and its purposes, and when it should be used for appeal, see Katz v. Carte
Blanche Corp., 496 F.2d 747, 753-56, 764-65 (3d Cir. 1974).
50. Note that Judge Weinstein refused to amend his order to include a § 1292(b)
statement. See note 5 supra and accompanying text. According to Judge Noel, the
question to be considered "is not whether an appeal can be permitted, but whether it
should be." E.F. Hutton & Co. v. Brown, 305 F. Supp. 371, 402 (S.D. Tex. 1969). It
is not for a district court to decide when appeal is permitted under § 1291 or § 1292(a),
since those are questions for a court of appeals, but rather to make findings under FED.
R. Crv. P. 54(b) or § 1292(b) as to the need for prompt appeal.
If certification under § 1292(b) was proper in a case where disqualification was
granted, as Judge Noel thought in Hutton, such certification seems even more appropri-
ate when disqualification is denied, because the injury that may result from erroneously
allowing an attorney to remain as counsel is greater than the possibility of delay and
expense incident to disqualification. See notes 44-46 supra.
51. Correcting an abuse of power by a lower court is the traditional basis for issuing
a writ of mandamus. See note 9 supra. Advisory mandamus, a term describing the use
of mandamus to review new and important questions, is based on Schlagenhauf v.
Holder, 379 U.S. 104 (1964). Although the ability of courts to review such issues is
questionable when the traditional allegations of usurpation of power are absent, some
courts have cited Schlagenhauf and have claimed such power. See, e.g., In re Ellsberg,
446 F.2d 954 (lst Cir. 1971); United States v. United States Dist. Court, 444 F.2d 651,https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol1975/iss1/16
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mandamus approach might be preferable if a court desired to review
the order and yet protect the professed sanctity of the final judgment
rule.52  Allowing direct appeal, however, has the advantage of per-
656 (6th Cir. 1971), affd, 407 U.S. 297 (1972). See generally Note, Supervisory and
Advisory Mandamus Under the All Writs Act, 86 HAIv. L. REv. 595 (1973). Review
by mandamus of a trial court's departure from a traditional standard is within an apel-
late court's supervisory power. This supervisory mandamus, while relatively undefined
in scope, is based on LaBuy v. Howes Leather Co., 352 U.S. 249 (1957). See generally
9 MooRE 1 110.26.
In a long and eloquent opinion, filled with policy arguments against unnecessary re-
strictions on young attorneys temporarily associating themselves with large law firms,
Judge Weinstein departed from the traditional standards employed in determining dis-
qualification. Silver Chrysler Plymouth, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 370 F. Supp.
581 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). He painted an elaborate picture of large law firms monopolizing
the best legal talents for their Icients. If, in addition, the Canons imply restrictive cove-
nants needlessly interfering with the freedom of both litigants and young attorneys, he
felt that serious antitrust questions could arise. Id. at 589-91. The facts, as found by
Judge Weinstein, may not have required disqualification under the traditional "substan-
tially related" test, first enunciated in T.C. Theatre Corp. v. Warner Bros. Pictures,
Inc., 113 F. Supp. 265, 268 (S.D.N.Y. 1953). Yet, having enunciated a new standard
affecting innumerable present and past lawyers in large New York law firms and their
clients, Judge Weinstein should have certified the order for immediate appeal. Since
Judge Weinstein did not certify the order for appeal under § 1292(b), however, this case
would have been an appropriate one for the use of supervisory mandamus, even if'the
court of appeals found it unnecessary to reverse the decision. Although the considera-
tions that might persuade a district judge to certify an appeal under § 1292(b) need not
be as substantial as those requiring the extraordinary remedy of mandamus, the order
in this case would seem to satisfy the requirements for review by either method.
52. Since review under the mandamus approach does not require a finding that there
was a final judgment, the definition of "final" is not changed; nor is there a direct at-
tack on the federal policy against piecemeal appeals, since provisions for review by writ
are as time-honored as the final judgment requirement, with regard to the federal system.
See note 9 supra and accompanying text; cf. 38 TEXAs L. Rtv. 792, 793-94 (1960) (in-
dicating Texas would entertain writ of mandamus but not direct appeal of order denying
disqualification). Some states have used the writ of certiorari approach to grant review
of some orders refusing to disqualify opposing counsel. See, e.g., Brasseaux v. Girouard,
214 So. 2d 401 (La. Ct. App. 1968); Kurbitz v. Kurbitz, 77 Wash. 2d 943, 468 P.2d
673 (1970). Some states allow direct appeals. See, e.g., Schmidt v. Pine Lawn Mem-
orial Park, Inc., 86 S.D. 501, 198 N.W.2d 496 (1972). California allows such direct
appeals via the injunction method. See note 3 supra. New York law provides for ap-
peal as of right from any order deciding a motion that affects a substantial right or in-
volves some part of the merits. N.Y. Civ. PRAc. §§ 5701(a) (2) (iv), (v) (McKinney
1963).
The mandamus approach has the advantage of allowing the court of appeals to limit
the number of cases it reviews, since the writs are discretionary and a court can reject
a petition for a writ without hearing. 9 MooRE 110.10, at 136. The use of mandamus
to review a judge's refusual to disqualify himself when a party files an affidavit of bias
or prejudice under 28 U.S.C. § 144 (1970) exemplifies how such a system of review
would probably operate for disqualifications of counsel. Professor Moore notes that "al-
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mitting the appellate court to adjudicate the merits of the question
without lingering over jurisdictional issues.
Despite these alternatives, the Second Circuit has taken a definite
position allowing direct appeal of all orders either granting or denying
disqualification. Its unanimous en banc decision may influence those
circuits not already permitting such appeals to reconsider their posi-
tions.5" Finally, the court's willingness to consider practical problems
caused by unappealability-such as uncertainty, prejudicial error, and
irreparable injury-may induce more litigants to attempt appeals of
presently unappealable interlocutory orders."4
though the courts of appeal insist that review by mandamus may be had only in excep-
tional cases, it appears to be granted rather commonly in this area . . . ." 9 MooRE
110.13[101, at 187-88. For discussions of the history of disqualification of judges and
analyses of various proposed changes see Frank, Disqualification of Judges: In Support
of the Bayh Bill, 35 LAw & CoN'ruMP. PROB. 43 (1970); Note, Disqualification of
Judges and Justices in the Federal Courts, 86 HARv. L. REv. 736 (1973).
53. The Ninth Circuit may decide to grant direct appeals rather than use the manda-
mus approach. Its decision in Cord v. Smith, 338 F.2d 516 (9th Cir. 1964), did not
expressly consider the collateral order doctrine, and there was considerable reliance in
that opinion on the now overruled Fleischer case. See note 18 supra. The Third Cir-
cuit was obviously convinced of the desirability of allowing immediate appeal, and it
may now be less inclined to restrict the availability of such appeal. See notes 16 & 35
supra. The Fourth and District of Columbia Circuits, see notes 19 & 37 supra, as well
as those circuits which have not yet faced the issue at all, may be similarly influenced
to allow direct appeals.
54. In United States v. Beckerman, Civil No. 74-2478 (2d Cir., May 13, 1975), the
Second Circuit held that a denial of a motion to dismiss a criminal indictment on the
ground of double jeopardy was directly appealable. The court noted that this "logical
extension of the concept of appealability expressed in Cohen" was "in keeping with
Sil'er Chrysler .... ." Id. at 3510.
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